

III.—Antisthenes was no Logician

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We first meet Antisthenes in Xenophon¹ as a devoted and constant companion of Socrates, especially in the *Symposium*, where something like a statement of his general attitude is put into his mouth. Each of those present states and defends the greatest good he thinks he possesses, the thing of which he is most proud. Antisthenes says this is his wealth — even though he hasn't an obol. True riches, he tells us, reside in the soul. So many rich men, even tyrants, are really very poor, for they are always laboring to increase their possessions, and one may well pity the grievous disease that is theirs. Antisthenes himself always has enough to eat and drink, and clothes that keep him as warm as Callias with all his money. His house is a sufficient shelter. When in need of sexual satisfaction, any woman that is available can give it to him, and because others reject her she is even grateful. He would not pray for greater pleasures than these but for less, for some of them are already excessive. Moreover, if all his possessions were taken away, any kind of job will provide their equivalent. Pleasure is derived from the soul itself, not from buying expensive things in the market place; and the pleasure is much greater if we wait until the need is felt, rather than, as he is doing now, drinking good wine when he is not thirsty. This kind of riches makes men free and

¹ *Memorabilia* 2.5.3, in a discussion of the value of friends, and 3.11.17, where he is mentioned as one who is constantly with Socrates. In the *Symposium*, Antisthenes teases Socrates about Xanthippe (2.10) and a little later (2.12) Socrates calls out to him that no one will now contradict (*ἀντιλέγειν*) and say that courage cannot be taught. When Callias says that he makes men better by giving them money, Antisthenes challenges him and agrees that *καλοκάγαθια* and *δικαιοσύνη* are the same (3.4), that justice is in the soul, not in the purse (4.2). He also reminds Niceratus that even rhapsodes, that silly tribe, know their Homer by heart, and Socrates says presumably the rhapsodes do not know the allegories (3.6). Antisthenes also challenges Niceratus' claim that knowledge of all things can be got from Homer (4.6–7). The most important passages for our purpose are 4.34–44, where Antisthenes declaims on wealth in the soul, and 4.61–4, where Socrates says Antisthenes is a *μαστροπός* in the sense that he can bring together people who need each other as, for example, he introduced Callias to Prodicus and Hippias. Finally, in 8.4 Antisthenes protests his love for Socrates.

good, for they do not then covet the possessions of others. It is from Socrates that he has received all of it that he could carry, and he himself can share it freely with all. The greatest luxury that it provides is leisure, the leisure to attend to the things that are really worth while, and above all the leisure to listen to Socrates.

This passage is rightly regarded as the first expression in literature of the general attitude which later became characteristic of both Cynics and Stoics. It puts all the emphasis upon one aspect of the Socratic doctrines and personality: indifference to wealth, self-control, complete devotion to the right. But there is a difference: Socrates was indifferent to poverty, Antisthenes makes a virtue of it; Socrates was vitally concerned to discover the nature of the good, Antisthenes was apt to take the nature of the good for granted.² Later tradition, with its mania for philosophic "successions," made Antisthenes the founder of Cynicism. We may well doubt the tradition, for any direct contact between him and Diogenes is improbable,³ but there can be no doubt of the general likeness in point of view. And if Antisthenes was free from the more extreme forms of shamelessness or *anaideia* displayed by Diogenes, he already had more than a trace of it.⁴

That Antisthenes in Xenophon shows interest only in the more directly moral aspect of the Socratic doctrine is not conclusive evidence that he had no other interests, since it was this aspect which appealed to Xenophon's unphilosophic mind.⁵ Such fragments and accounts of him as we possess, however, give the same impression. We are told that he taught that the aim or *telos* was

² Diogenes Laertius 6.11: αὐτάρκη δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν μηδενὸς προσδεομένην ὅτι μὴ Σωκρατικῆς ἰσχύος· τὴν τε ἀρετὴν τῶν ἔργων εἶναι μῆτε λόγων πλείστων δεομένην μῆτε μαθημάτων.

³ On this point see D. R. Dudley, *A History of Cynicism* (London 1937) 1-8.

⁴ The reference to sexual satisfaction referred to above (Xen. *Symp.* 4.38) is a case in point, and we find similar vigorous and rather brutal statements in Diogenes Laertius, who tells us that Antisthenes had the reputation of treating his pupils harshly (6.4 and 21). The fragments give other examples, see particularly 5, 9, 15, 20, 41, 45 in Mullach's *Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum*, vol. 2 (Paris 1865) and *passim*. References to Mullach's fragments refer also to the supporting material under those numbers.

⁵ It has been suggested that Xenophon's picture of Socrates was influenced by Antisthenes. If that were so, our thesis would thereby be strengthened, as Xenophon is not given to logical discussions, but the conjecture is unnecessary. It is natural that both should be most impressed by the moral character rather than the philosophy of Socrates. For an elaborate study of the alleged relationship between Xenophon and Antisthenes see K. Joel's *Der Echte und der Xenophontische Sokrates* (Berlin 1893).

to live according to virtue, that virtue can be taught, and he showed a considerable hostility to pleasure;⁶ but we find no trace anywhere of any serious discussion of the nature of virtue or of pleasure. In view of the later position of Heracles as a Stoic saint, it is interesting to find that Antisthenes wrote a work entitled *Heracles*, in which he apparently emphasized the moral value of *ponos* or labor (fr. 12). His Homeric writings seem to have been concerned with ethics and the ethical meaning of words: we have a long fragment on the ethical implications of the epithet *πολύτροπος* as applied to Odysseus.⁷ There are, throughout the fragments, a number of stern moral epigrams, such as that it is kingly to do good and be ill spoken of. Antisthenes also wrote a violent attack on Plato, of which the main point that has been preserved is his complete disbelief in the existence of the Forms.⁸

All this points to a man of no very deep philosophic understanding, who was tremendously attracted by the stoic side of Socrates' character,⁹ but who was blind to the deeper implications of his master's doctrine.

It is quite consistent that such a man should be somewhat contemptuous of philosophic discussion in the Platonic sense, and that he should have used, in his opposition, the regular logic-chopping stock-in-trade of the Sophists. That he did so we know from the incontrovertible evidence of Aristotle who tells us clearly that Antisthenes maintained it was impossible to contradict, to make a false statement, or a predicative statement, or to define anything. The inevitable result is to make all knowledge, indeed all discussion, impossible. All this fits the man who said that virtue was the most important thing in life but did not investigate what virtue is.

Aristotle's evidence is definite and clear, and as far as it goes no one really denies it; but many attempts have been made to make it go a great deal further, by construing the passages so as

⁶ Fr. 1 and 2 in Mullach, and Diog. Laert. 6.3: *μανεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθεῖν*.

⁷ Mullach 26. With this we should link Socrates' sarcastic remark (above, note 1) that the rhapsodes evidently don't know the allegories. This is contemporary evidence that Antisthenes indulged in what was to be a Stoic pastime for centuries.

⁸ Fr. 44 (Mullach): *ἵππον μὲν ὁρῶ, ἱππότητα δ' οὐχ ὁρῶ*. To which Plato's alleged reply is also preserved: *ἔχεις μὲν ᾧ ἵππος ὁρᾶται τόδε τὸ ὄμμα, ᾧ δὲ ἱππότης θεωρεῖται οὐδέπω κέκτησαι*.

⁹ As Diogenes Laertius puts it (6.2): *παρ' οὗ καὶ τὸ καρτερικὸν λαβὼν καὶ τὸ ἀπαθὲς ζηλώσας κατήρξε πρῶτος τοῦ κυνισμοῦ*. It has already been suggested that the direct connection with Cynicism is exaggerated, but there is no doubt as to the general attitude.

to credit to Antisthenes the comments of Aristotle himself. The next step is then to follow this will of the wisp through the Platonic dialogues and to see references to Antisthenes in every passage where anything resembling these comments is found. On the evidence of these supposed allusions a philosophy of Antisthenes is built, and further references to this are found.¹⁰

This process has been going on for more than a century, and some of its conclusions are in danger of being taken for granted on impressive authority alone. Our object here is to look afresh at the actual evidence, which is found in three passages of Aristotle.

The first is *Topica* 104B.21, though here there is no possibility of controversy as Aristotle simply gives as an example of a paradoxical thesis the opinion of Antisthenes that contradiction is impossible: οἶον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν, καθάπερ ἔφη Ἀντισθένης. . . . No other words can be made relevant, and we thus have a simple statement, which, however, should be noted.

The second passage should be equally non-controversial. It occurs in the fourth book of the *Metaphysics*, in the course of a short statement on the nature of falsehood — ψεῦδος. Falsehood is divided into falsehood of fact and of *logoi*. Aristotle then says:¹¹

¹⁰ The boldest and least convincing recent attempt to build up Antisthenes into a great logician is C. M. Gillespie's "The Logic of Antisthenes" in *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 26 (1913) 479–500, and 27 (1914) 17–38. A much more sober attempt is K. von Fritz' "Zur Antisthenischen Erkenntnistheorie und Logik" in *Hermes* 62 (1927) 453–484. Natorp's article on Antisthenes in Pauly-Wissowa gives a very full account of all the scholars who built up Antisthenes in the last century, and what Platonic passages each believed to refer to him. See also Zeller, *Socrates and the Socratic Schools* (London 1877) 284 ff. Zeller admits that the doctrines of Antisthenes were subversive of all knowledge (pp. 291 and 301), yet is led to credit him with constructive logical theories (p. 296). G. C. Field, in *Plato and His Contemporaries* (London 1930) 160–4, also accepts the usual interpretation of *Met.* 1043B, as does D. R. Dudley (above, note 3) 1–15. See also Wilamowitz, *Platon* (Berlin 1929) I.261–4 and II.160–1; P. Friedländer, *Platon* (Leipzig 1930) II.453–4; and C. Ritter, *Platon* (München 1923) II.115. On the other hand P. Shorey, *What Plato Said* (Chicago 1933) 37–40, is very sceptical of this "vast fabric of hypotheses about the relations of Plato and Antisthenes." L. Campbell, in the preface to his edition of the *Theaetetus*, xxix, speaks of a "misunderstanding" of *Met.* 1043B. A. Levi, "Le Teorie Metafisiche, Logiche e Gnoseologiche di Antistene," in *Revue d'Histoire de la Philosophie* 4 (1930) 227–249 comes nearest to my interpretation of that passage. A. E. Taylor, *Plato, The Man and His Work* (London 1926) pp. 86, 89, 96, 331, 386, refuses to see any references to Antisthenes' theories in Plato, and Burnet, *Thales to Plato* (London 1920) 251–2, is equally definite about the *Theaetetus*. F. M. Cornford is more doubtful in *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (London 1949) 144 and 254.

¹¹ *Metaphysics* 1024B.26–1025A.1: λόγος δὲ ψευδὴς ὁ τῶν μὴ ὄντων ἢ ψευδὴς· διὸ πᾶς λόγος ψευδὴς ἑτέρου ἢ οὐ ἔστιν ἀληθής, οἷον ὁ τοῦ κύκλου ψευδὴς τριγώνου. ἐκάστου

A false *logos*, in so far as it is false, is about things that are not. Every *logos* is false when applied to something other than that of which it is true. So the *logos* of a circle is false when applied to a triangle. In one sense there is a *logos* of each thing as one thing — the *logos* of its essence — but in another sense there are many, since a thing is both itself and itself qualified, for example Socrates and Socrates musical. A false *logos* is not the *logos* of a thing unqualified.

Aristotle is here drawing a distinction between *logos* as definition, of which there is only one for each thing, and *logos* as predicative statement, of which many can be applied to the same thing — as many as it has qualities. A false definition is quite different from a false predication. He then goes on to say that Antisthenes ignored this difference between definition and predication, with dire consequences:

That is why it was silly of Antisthenes to think that a thing could only be mentioned by its own *logos*, one *logos* for each thing. It followed from this that it is impossible to contradict, and hardly possible to make a false statement. But it is possible to mention a thing not only by its own *logos*. . . .

Clearly, there is no reference to Antisthenes before he is mentioned, and the distinction between the two kinds of *logoi*, predication and definition, is Aristotle's own. Indeed, Antisthenes is termed simple-minded because he ignored it. The only theory attributed to him is the crudely sophistic one that a thing can only be mentioned by its own *logos* (definition or name?) with the result that he denied the possibility of contradiction and false statement. Most commentators since Alexander of Aphrodisias have so interpreted the passage, though efforts have been made to attribute the earlier statement, the very difference between definition and predication which he is blamed for ignoring, to Antisthenes.¹²

δὲ λόγος ἔστι μὲν ὡς εἰς, ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἔστι δὲ ὡς πολλοί, ἐπεὶ ταῦτό πως αὐτό καὶ αὐτὸ πεπονθός, οἷον Σωκράτης καὶ Σωκράτης μουσικός. ὁ δὲ ψευδὴς λόγος οὐδενός ἐστιν ἀπλῶς λόγος. διὸ Ἀντισθένης ᾤετο εἰήθως μὴδὲν ἀξιῶν λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οἰκέλῳ λόγῳ ἐν ἑφ' ἐνός. ἐξ ὧν συνέβαινε μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν, σχεδὸν δὲ μὴδὲ ψεύδεσθαι. ἔστι δ' ἕκαστον λέγειν οὐ μόνον τῷ αὐτοῦ λόγῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἑτέρου. . . . I have kept the word *logos* throughout the translation because it is obvious that Aristotle uses it here in several senses, and it may well be that none of these corresponds exactly to the way Antisthenes used it. It means in any case definition as well as predication. In Antisthenes it may have meant word or name as well. The Oxford translators render it by "conception," but this is very misleading for in this context it certainly means a thing said, and not only thought.

¹² Gillespie (above, note 10) certainly does so, if not explicitly on p. 480, without any doubt in the body of the article, e.g. on p. 22. Alexander of Aphrodisias' com-

The third passage is the most important for our purpose and consistently misinterpreted. It occurs in the eighth book of *Metaphysics*, and the question immediately preceding is whether *οὐσία*, substance, can exist apart. It cannot do so, we are told, at least in the case of some *artefacta* like houses and instruments, and (1043B.21):

Perhaps neither these things themselves, nor any other things not put together by nature, are substances, for one might say that nature is the only substance in destructible things.

The point is the difficulty of establishing the substance of a thing, particularly of artificial compounds, which may not be substance in the proper sense at all. Aristotle then continues:¹³

So the difficulty of the Antistheneans and other such uncultured people has some relevance here: that it is not possible to define the essence of a thing, for, they say, a definition is a long rigmarole.¹⁴

Again a clear statement: Antisthenes denied the possibility of definition.¹⁵ Aristotle continues:

But it *is* possible to explain of what kind a thing is, as with silver: we cannot say what it is, but that it is like tin. So there is a substance of which there can be a statement and a formula, as for ex-

ments on this passage are enlightening in this connection, particularly (*In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria*, ed. Hayduck, Berlin 1891, 434.25): *εἰπὼν δὲ ταῦτα αἰτιᾶται 'Αντισθένην εὐήθως λέγοντα . . . παρακρουσθέντα ὑπὸ τοῦ τὸν ψευδῆ λόγον μηδενὸς ἀπλῶς εἶναι λόγον· οὐ γὰρ εἰ μὴ ἀπλῶς ἐστὶ μηδὲ κυρίως, ἥδη καὶ οὐκ ἐστίν.*

¹³ 1043B.23-32: *ὥστε ἡ ἀπορία ἦν οἱ 'Αντισθένοι καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαλδευτοὶ ἠγόρουσαν ἔχει τινὰ καιρὸν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ τί ἐστὶ ὁρίσασθαι, τὸν γὰρ ὅρον λόγον εἶναι μακρόν. ἀλλὰ ποῖον μὲν τί ἐστὶ ἐνδέχεται καὶ διδάξαι ὥσπερ ἄργυρον, τί μὲν ἐστίν οὐ, ὅτι δ' οἷον καττί- τερος. ὥστ' οὐσίας ἐστὶ μὲν ἥς ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ὅρον καὶ λόγον, οἷον τῆς συνθέτου, ἐάντε αἰσθητῇ ἐάντε νοητῇ ἦ· ἐξ ὧν δ' αὕτη πρῶτων οὐκ ἐτι, εἴπερ τι κατὰ τινὸς σημαίνει ὁ λόγος ὁ ὁριστικὸς καὶ δεῖ τὸ μὲν ὥσπερ ὕλην εἶναι τὸ δὲ ὡς μορφὴν.* My interpretation requires *ἐνδέχεται*, as read by both Ross and Schwegler, and the best MSS; there is an inferior variant *ἐνδέχασθαι*. I have removed the parenthesis usually printed round the words *τὸν γὰρ . . . μακρόν* and put a stop after *μακρόν*. Note the construction: *ὅτι . . . ὁρίσασθαι*, then the accusative and infinitive. If the quotation continued after *ἀλλὰ* I feel sure we should have had either a continuation of the accusative and infinitive, or a *μὲν* in the first part of the quotation, or a repetition of *ὅτι* after *ἀλλὰ*.

¹⁴ Ross (note *ad loc.*) interprets the expression as meaning "a diffuse and evasive answer," and refers to XIV, 1091A.8, where Aristotle himself defines the phrase: *γίγνεται ὁ μακρὸς λόγος ὥσπερ ὁ τῶν δούλων ὅταν μὴδὲν ὑγιὲς λέγουσιν* (see Ross' note). Any other interpretation, for example Gillespie's "a compound name" (482), simply does not make sense in this passage.

¹⁵ So Ross in note on B.23-5. See also Alexander (554 Hayduck): *ἐστὶ δ' αὐτῶν ἡ ἀπορία ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶν ὁρίσασθαι, οὐδ' ἐστὶν ὁρισμὸς τινος.*

ample that of a compound, be it perceptible or intelligible; though the primary elements of which it is composed cannot be defined, if the defining *logos* asserts something of something, and one part of it is as the matter and the other as the form.

I suggest that the only thing attributed to Antisthenes here is that definition is impossible. That is the "difficulty" or *aporia*, and it is relevant in so far as we are not sure what the substance of things is. What follows are the comments of Aristotle: ἀλλὰ . . . ἐνδέχεται, "but it *is* possible . . ." (even where the substance is uncertain). This seems much the best construction and quite in Aristotle's manner. It also gives the most natural sense.¹⁶ What Aristotle says in effect is that it is difficult to establish the nature of the substance, especially in the case of artificial compounds which indeed may not have it — to this extent Antisthenes' theory that it is impossible to define anything (which Aristotle expresses in his own words) has a certain relevance, since it is the essence or substance that we attempt to define. In spite of all these difficulties, however, you can say what a thing is like, and you can analyze a compound into its component elements (as Plato showed in the *Theaetetus*). Both of these Antisthenes would deny.

Those who follow the usual interpretation,¹⁷ which attributes all this to Antisthenes, that you can both say what a thing is like and define a compound into its components, do not explain the following difficulties raised by their far less natural construction:

a) Not only is the language of the sentence Aristotelian (Aristotle often puts other people's ideas in his own technical language) but so are the ideas. Certainly Antisthenes would never have admitted the existence, let alone the definition or analysis, of intelligible compounds, or indeed of any intelligibles at all. Nor could he have spoken of a definition being partly matter and partly form.

b) The statement that one can say that silver is like tin is obviously meant to be a significant statement about silver; it points

¹⁶ Levi (above, note 10) 241–4, sees that the definition of compounds by analysis cannot be attributed to Antisthenes, but he still attributes to him the previous statement that you can say what a thing is like.

¹⁷ So Ross, Schwegler and the Oxford translators, as well as those mentioned above in note 10. Alexander's comment seems a bit confused: he appears to say that to say what a thing is like, and to analyze a *physical* compound into its components was thought possible by Antisthenes and those like him, but the *definition* of compounds is denied by them and asserted by Aristotle (554 Hayduck).

to a common quality between silver and tin and is therefore a form of predication, a statement of quality. It could not therefore have been made by Antisthenes who refused to see the difference between predication and definition and who insisted that you can only refer to a thing by its own *oikeios logos*.

c) The theory that compounds (even if only physical compounds) could be defined or analyzed into their component parts could hardly have been held by Antisthenes, since he denied the possibility of predication or definition, or that anything could be mentioned except by its own *logos*. Nor does it seem to fit in with his denial of the possibility of error. Moreover, this interesting theory, which Plato discusses at some length (*Theaet.* 201E), and which is of some subtlety, can hardly be attributed to one whom Aristotle called an uncultured simpleton, and whose known theories are always referred to with contempt by Plato.

From our examination of these passages we may conclude that the only logical theories, if they deserve the name, that Aristotle mentions as belonging to Antisthenes are the usual sophistic and eristic tricks which Plato exposed as contrary to all philosophic or scientific investigation: that it is impossible to contradict, to define, to predicate, or to make a false statement.

Nor is there any serious evidence outside Aristotle for any Antisthenic logic. Only one sentence in Diogenes could be interpreted to support it, but he gives no authority for it and it has deservedly received little attention. Diogenes tells us (6.3) that Antisthenes was the first to define *logos* when he said: "The *logos* is that which shows what a thing is or was," λόγος ἐστὶν ὃ τὸ τί ἦν ἢ ἐστὶ δηλῶν.¹⁸ If genuine, this fragment should no doubt be brought into relation with Aristotle's statement that Antisthenes said a thing could only be referred to by its *oikeios logos* and in no other way. *Logos* cannot here mean definition since, as we have seen, Aristotle says that Antisthenes denied the possibility of definition, which was to him only "a long rigmarole." Antisthenes may have meant simply that the only *logos*, the only word or expression which

¹⁸ There is also a reference to Antisthenes in Alexander's *Commentary* on the *Topica* of Aristotle (ed. M. Wallies, Berlin 1896, p. 42) where he is referred to as one of those who mistakenly considered τί ἦν as an adequate expression, as against Aristotle's τί ἦν εἶναι. There seems to be some confusion here, but as far as it goes this supports Diogenes in attributing the expression τί ἦν to Antisthenes.

you could use to mention a thing was its name. You can name things, but that is all.¹⁹

With this may be linked a quotation from Antisthenes in Epicetetus (1.17): ἀρχὴ παιδείσεως ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων σκέψις, which may point to the fact that Antisthenes had some theory of the importance of names, perhaps no more than has just been mentioned. Indeed it may mean even less, for Prodicus might well have said the same thing. In any case, it is no evidence to attribute to Antisthenes any elaborate theory of language.²⁰

The list of titles of Antisthenes' works given by Diogenes Laertius has also been used as evidence of serious logical theorizing. Most of them, however, are obviously moral diatribes. We have already seen evidence that his Homeric writings were most probably not much more. All were apparently fairly well written, since they pleased Cicero, but his verdict was that they were the work of a sharp wit rather than a man of learning.²¹ He wrote on politics, but Athenaeus (5.220D) tells us that his *Politicus* at any rate was mainly "a running down" — καταδρομή — of Athenian politicians. *Sathon* or *On Contradiction* sounds deep, but tradition says it was mainly a violent attack on Plato. There is no evidence that the half-dozen or so works with logical titles were any more profound. We may wonder, as Plato is reported to have done (Diog. Laert. 3.35) how one can write in disagreement with others to prove that contradiction is impossible, but that is not likely to have inhibited Antisthenes.

Cicero also tells us that Antisthenes said that there were many popular, but only one natural god.²² The statement was not very original by his time, though it foreshadows the Stoic synthesis between polytheism and monotheism; at any rate, it is no evidence of logical theories.

¹⁹ Gillespie is probably right to see a close connection between "one thing, one logos" and "one thing, one name" (482 and *passim*). This, however, does not justify him in attributing to Antisthenes any elaborate theories of language, and then saying that Cratylus in the dialogue named after him is only a mask for Antisthenes. A comment of Alexander (554 Hayduck) on the *aporia* of 1043B is also interesting in this connection: ἐπειδὴ οὖν ὁ ὀρισμὸς οὐκ ἔστιν ὄνομα, οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρίσασθαι. For logos as name see also *Euthyd.* 285E, *Cratyl.* 387c and Proclus, *In Cratyl.* 45.

²⁰ Von Fritz bases his reconstruction largely on this quotation in Epicetetus.

²¹ *Ad Atticum* 12.38: hominis acuti magis quam eruditi. Also under fr. 8 in Mullach.

²² *De Nat. Deor.* 1.13; and also fr. 24 (Mullach).

If we now turn to the Platonic text, we find Antisthenes mentioned in the *Phaedo* (59B) as present at the death of Socrates. There is no other specific reference to him, though the views we know him to have held are, naturally, brought up in discussion. That it is impossible to make a false statement is discussed in *Cratylus* 429B, and also in *Euthydemus* 283E. In the latter dialogue we also have the impossibility of contradiction at 285D, and *Sophist* 251B-C mentions the theory that predication is impossible. Plato is of course concerned to disprove these negations, but it is worth noting that all three are mentioned as held by a good many people, in no way new, and somewhat contemptuously dismissed.²³ When Isocrates refers to these same views, he does so in much the same manner.²⁴ In all these cases it is hard to see any direct reference to any one person, be it Antisthenes or another.

If our interpretation of the two passages from the *Metaphysics* is correct, there is no reason to see any reference to Antisthenes anywhere else in Plato, though a great deal of scholarly ingenuity has been expended in such attempts.²⁵

²³ *Crat.* 429D: ἄρα ὅτι ψευδῆ λέγειν τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἔστιν . . . συχνοὶ γὰρ τινες οἱ λέγοντες . . . καὶ νῦν καὶ πάλαι. The argument is then refuted with particular reference to Cratylus' theory of "true names." Regarding the denial of contradiction and falsehood, Socrates says in *Euthyd.* 286c: καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν σφόδρα ἐχρῶντο αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ ἐτι παλαιότεροι, and in *Sophist* 251B (about predication): τοῖς τε νέοις καὶ τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθέσι θόλην παρεσκευάκαμεν. . . . ἐντυγχάνεις γὰρ . . . πολλὰ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐσπουδαῖοσι, ἐνίοτε πρεσβυτέροις ἀνθρώποις. . . .

²⁴ Isocr. *Helen* 1.

²⁵ The most important of the other passages is *Theaet.* 201D ff., where Theaetetus puts forward, as a definition of knowledge, ἀληθὴς δόξα μετὰ λόγου. This whole theory is attributed to Antisthenes, in particular by Gillespie (483). For this there is not a scrap of evidence, on any interpretations of the *Metaphysics* passages or any others. However, in the following attempt to define *logos* in this connection, Socrates then brings up the suggestion that compounds can be defined by analyzing them into their components, though the latter remain indefinable. This is, of course, the theory mentioned in *Met.* 1043B, and those who there attribute it to Antisthenes naturally see a reference to him here. However, if our interpretation of that passage is correct, the basis for any reference to Antisthenes in the *Theaetetus* disappears. Gillespie makes much (483) of Plato's use of the expression οἰκείος λόγος in *Theaet.* 202A, a phrase which Aristotle, as we have seen, attributes to Antisthenes in *Met.* 1024B (quoted above). But Aristotle's use of the words does not prove that the phrase belonged to Antisthenes, though, even if it did, the use of it by Plato here does not mean that the whole context can be attributed to him. The fact that Socrates brings forward this theory of compounds "as a dream" has little significance, and rather suggests that Plato thought of it himself.

We have seen that there is a certain similarity between the position of Antisthenes, that all you could say of a thing was its own *logos* (name?) and certain things said by Cratylus. There is no evidence, however, for crediting to Antisthenes any theories

And so we are left in the end with much the same Antisthenes with whom we started: an earnest, blunt, vigorous and sharp-witted man whom tradition, on the whole faithfully enough, represented as the forerunner of Cynicism and Stoicism. He was probably middle-aged when he came under the influence of Socrates and was already well established as a friend of the Sophists, for tradition also represents him as a pupil of Gorgias, and Xenophon tells us, as we saw, that it was he who introduced Callias to both Hippias and Prodicus, which argues an early and close acquaintance with these Sophists in his own right. It is also from the Sophists, no doubt, that he acquired his general scepticism about philosophical discussion in the Platonic sense, and a quiverful of verbal darts to use against it.

There is no reason to think that when he came under the spell of Socrates he abandoned his former ways, or felt it as the kind of conversion which necessitates a complete break with one's past life.²⁶ It was not the Socratic search for definitions, for real knowledge, which attracted or impressed him; it was the Socrates whom Alcibiades saw imperturbable in defeat at the battle of Delium, the man who was unmoved by public clamor after the battle of Arginusae, who resisted the blandishments of Alcibiades as easily as the power of the thirty tyrants. The difference between the Sophists and Socrates was there for all to see, but there is no reason to think that it was the same sharp antagonism in the streets of Athens as we find in the dialogues of Plato.

After Socrates' death, an inevitable cleavage arose between the followers whom his strong personality had held together. Some

on the origin of language. Cratylus was an extreme Heraclitean, yet Gillespie wants to see in him a mere mask for Antisthenes, and maintains at the same time that the theories of Antisthenes had nothing in common with the relativism of either Heraclitus or Protagoras (445-8; 35-8).

References to Antisthenes have been inferred in many other places in Plato; in the *Apology*, the *Protagoras*, *Euthyphro*, *Ion*, *Alcibiades*, *Charmides*, *Hippias* I and II and, more specifically, in *Theaet.* 152A, 161c, 169B, 174A, 175D, 176c, 187; *Rep.* 372D, 479A, 505B, 568A, 583 ff.; *Soph.* 246, 252c, 259c; *Phil.* 14c, 15d, 17A. See Natorp (above, note 10).

²⁶ It is significant, and not without irony, that the unforgettable picture of this "stoic" Socrates is drawn for us by Plato, not by Xenophon. The existence of such Socratics as Antisthenes, on the other hand, is perhaps the best argument against the Burnet-Taylor position that the Platonic Socrates is historical. If Socrates had really developed the theory of Forms to the full, Antisthenes could hardly have been a devoted follower at all, and even Xenophon would have shown signs of discomfort.

of the younger men, like Phaedo and Euclides, concentrated on the logical or metaphysical implications of the master's doctrines. We may well believe that others, like Antisthenes, thought such studies both useless and un-Socratic. Of this second group Antisthenes was probably the most powerful mouthpiece. Only Plato, with his deeper understanding, could work out a synthesis between all aspects of the Socratic personality and doctrines.